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Legal and Ethical Aspects of Human Reproductive Cloning
Abstract. The aim of the essay is to explore the legal aspects of human reproductive cloning. Firstly, it gives a 
short introduction to the biological background of cloning, where special emphasis is laid upon the method of 
“somatic cell nuclear transfer” in connection with the existing forms of assisted reproductive technologies. The 
essay analyses the legal regulation in Hungary, Germany, England and the United States, and argues that the 
statutory prohibition of reproductive cloning often does not correspond to the biological facts, and this 
terminological ambiguity may lead to legal obscurity. Beyond that, the study also examines the factual and moral 
arguments against human reproductive cloning and the well-debated questions relating to reproductive rights, and 
fi nally, it attempts to search answers to what justifi es the intervention and the rigid statutory ban on this fi eld.
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1. Introduction
In the decades following World War II, Josef Mengele, who fl ed to South America, created 
viable embryos from the carefully preserved DNA of Adolf Hitler in the middle of the 
Brasilian jungle. According to a precise plan, the children born from these embryos were 
adopted by families all over the world.–The story comes from a movie of an Oscar winner 
director, called “The Boys from Brazil”.
In general, human reproductive cloning is fully accompanied by a harsh rejection by 
societies and this negative hostility is affected by numberless science fi ction movies and 
surreal conceptions about the reproduction of extremely famous and notorious persons or 
about the creation of a perfect army.1 However, the fact can be laid down: no man has been 
born by means of human reproductive cloning so far2 and legislatures also call for a ban on 
this method of procreation.
It is certainly another point how we approach the topic of cloning. Would we think 
about–which may sound weird at fi rst–that millions of “clones” are living in the world? 
They are called identical twins.3 Nevertheless, in this case the originally single embryo 
divides into two embryos under natural circumstances, in contrast to the scenario when it 
would be possible to create genetically identical progenies artifi cially.
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1 Robertson, J. A.: Why Human Reproductive Cloning Should not in all Cases be Prohibited. 
Journal of Legislation and Public Policy, 4 (2000–2001) 1, 36; Harris, J.: On Cloning. London, 2004. 
1; Sandor, J.: Introduction. In: Sandor, J. (ed.): Perfect Copy? Law and Ethics of Reproductive 
Medicine. Budapest, 2009. 8.
2 Elsner, D.: Just Another Reproductive Technology? The Ethics of Human Reproductive 
Cloning as an Experimental Medical Procedure. Journal of Medical Ethics, 32 (2006) 10, 596.
3 Silver, L. M.: Popular Cloning versus Scientifi c Cloning in Ethical Debates. Journal of 
Legislation and Public Policy, 4 (2000–2001) 1, 49.
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The following essay aims to explore the legal aspects of human reproductive cloning. 
Firstly, it gives a short introduction to the biological background of cloning, where special 
emphasis is laid upon the method of “somatic cell nuclear transfer” in connection with the 
existing forms of assisted reproductive technologies. The essay then analyses the legal 
regulation in the United States, Germany, England and Hungary. It argues that the statutory 
prohibition of reproductive cloning often does not correspond to the biological facts, and it 
draws the conclusion that the terminological vagueness may lead to legal obscurity. Beyond 
that, the essay also examines the moral arguments against human reproductive cloning and 
the well-debated questions relating to reproductive rights, and fi nally, it attempts to search 
answers to what justifi es the intervention and the rigid statutory ban on this fi eld.
2. Background and hypothetical signifi cance of reproductive cloning
Cloning4 can be broken down into two categories: embryo splitting and somatic cell nuclear 
transfer.
(1) In the case of embryo splitting, the cells (the so-called blastomeres) of a 4-to 8-cell 
stage embryo in vitro are separated into pieces, this means that the method allows to create 
viable identical twin embryos artifi cially similarly to the naturally occurring twinning. In 
this stage of development the embryonic cells (the blastomeres) are “totipotent”, which 
refers to that they are undifferentiated, possess the ability of self-renewal and they are 
capable to form any type of cell and can produce an entire organism, a whole human being.5
(2) The way of somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT) as compared to embryo splitting 
is more complicated, but it has demonstrated its biological success in the animal breeding, 
because this method led to the birth of the famous Scottish sheep named Dolly in 1997.6
In the course of SCNT the nucleus of an egg cell is removed and a nucleus of a somatic 
(body) cell, which contains the complete DNA, is transferred to the cytoplasm of the 
enucleated egg cell. The somatic cell can be any kind of body cells and it is gained from the 
individual that is to be cloned. Once the nucleus transfer has been done, the egg containing 
the genetic material of the nucleus of the somatic cell is artifi cially stimulated in order to 
begin to divide and to grow to form a viable embryo.7 Accordingly, the genetic blueprint of 
the cloned embryo is predicted by the genetic material of the nucleus of the somatic cell 
inserted into the enucleated egg.
However, it should be noted that the enucleated egg is not free from its original DNA 
because a small amount of so called mitochondrial DNA (mDNA) will be still remained in 
the egg-cytoplasm and thus mDNA will be inherited by the cloned embryo, though its 
4 Cloning itself is a kind of asexual reproduction. Several fi elds of science use the method of 
cloning, e.g. molecular biology or agriculture. See e.g. Shapiro, E. D. et al.: To Clone or not to Clone. 
Journal of Legislation and Public Policy, 4 (2000–2001) 1, 28.
5 Allegrucci, C.–Young, L. E.: Differences between Human Embryonic Stem Cell Lines. Human 
Reproduction Update, 13 (2007) 2, 103; Simson, S. E.: Breaking Barriers, Pushing Promise: America’s 
Need for an Embryonic Stem Cell Regulatory Scheme. Brooklyn Journal of International Law, 34 
(2009) 2, 538; Schütze, H.: Embryonale Humanstammzellen. Berlin, 2007. 5.
6 Knowles, L. P.: Science Policy and the Law: Reproductive and Therapeutic Cloning. Journal 
of Legislation and Public Policy, 4 (2000–2001) 1, 14.
7 Cibelli, J. B. et al.: Somatic Cell Nuclear Transfer in Humans: Pronuclear and Early Embryonic 
Development. The Journal of Regenerative Medicine, 2 (2001) 5, 25.
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amount in the cytoplasm is less than 1%.8 So the cloned embryo as opposed to the way of 
embryo splitting will not be genetically totally identical to the donor of the nucleus of the 
somatic cell.9
The signifi cance of SCNT resides in the groundbreaking promise of embryonic stem 
cell research and therapeutic cloning, which theme is beyond the scope of this essay. In that 
case the stem cells of a cloned early stage embryo with nearly perfect genetic matching may 
be used to treat numerous serious disorders.10 The aim of reproductive cloning would be to 
create another born and living human being, which is merely a hypothesis at present, but 
we could let our mind run upon it.
Albeit several social theories promulgate the superiority of sexual reproduction, which 
forms the basis of biological genetic diversity and variability, some authors suggest that 
reproductive cloning may complement the currently applied assisted reproductive 
technologies or it may offer an alternative to infertile couples.
Apart from popular science fi ction, in some types of infertility the couple is unable to 
provide gametes for the creation of an in vitro embryo and donor gamete(s) is necessary to 
produce an offspring, but the child will have obviously no biological connection to either 
one or both would-be parents. In contrast to the previous case, reproductive cloning may 
provide an opportunity for the would-be parents to share a biological connection with the 
cloned offspring in particular circumstances.
For example in cases of male infertility a nucleus of a somatic cell collected from the 
man would be placed in the woman’s enucleated egg and the resulting embryo would be 
implanted into the woman’s uterus to carry the child to term. Both parents and no one else 
would have genetic connection with the child, the man through his nuclear DNA, the 
woman through her low mDNA remaining in the egg-cytoplasm.11
Reproductive cloning could also be applied to cases of female infertility, but in this 
situation, by all means, a donor enucleated egg would be required and one of the parents 
would not have genetic relationship to the child.12 Nevertheless, the advantage of this 
method would be that not the whole genetic material would be transmitted to the child by 
the egg donor, solely the low cytoplasmic mDNA.
In the fi rst scenario, a stranger third-party donor would no more be needed for the 
assisted reproduction, while in the second one cloning would eliminate the transmission of 
the whole genetic trait of the egg donor. Consequently, traditional family structures could 
  8 Camporesi, S.–Boniolo, J.: Fearing a Non-Existing Minotaur? The Ethical Challenges of 
Research on Cytoplasmic Hybrid Embryos. Journal of Medical Ethics, 34 (2008) 11, 822; Dinnyés, 
A.: Őssejtek és a klónozás lehetőségei (Stem Cells and Possibilities of Cloning). Magyar Tudomány, 
XLX (2004) 4, 292.
  9 Wolf, E.: Kerntransfer und Reprogrammierung–Anwendungen in der Biotechnologie und 
Tierzucht. In: Köhler, W. (Hrsg.): Klonen–Forschung und Ethik im Konfl ikt. Deutsche Akademie der 
Naturforscher Halle, 2000. 23; Kunich, J. C.: The Naked Clone. How Cloning Bans Threaten Our 
Personal Rights. Westport, 2003. 6. 
10 Hucho, F.: Probleme der Stamzellforschung. In: Bühl, A. (Hrsg.): Auf dem Weg zur 
biomächtigen Gesellschaft? Chancen und Risiken der Gentechnik. Wiesbaden, 2009. 255; Simson: 
op. cit. 539. Cibelli: op. cit. 25–30.
11 Robertson (2000–2001): op. cit. 37.
12 See ibid. 38.
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be ensured by reproductive cloning under certain conditions.13 It should be mentioned that 
generally the main reason of reproduction whether natural or artifi cial is to have a 
genetically related child.14
Moreover, some authors emphasize that reproductive cloning could open the way for 
same-sex couples to have biologically related offspring, especially for lesbians without the 
need of a male donor, one party would provide an egg and the other a body cell. Certainly it 
would be more diffi cult for gay couples whereas reproduction would by all means require a 
donated egg (which would then be enucleated) but a gestational surrogate mother, too.15 
3. Vagueness of legal regulations
Notwithstanding the legislatures nearly in each country agree that reproductive cloning 
should be banned, the legal regulation as compared to the intent of the law-makers lacks 
accuracy and precision. The statutes do not cover the biological possibilities.
The Hungarian Health Care Act sets forth the defi nition of embryo as the following: 
embryo means every living human embryo following the completion of fertilisation until 
the 12th week of gestation.16 However, in the biological sense, this defi nition does not 
concern an embryo created via SCNT, where the living human embryo comes into existence 
by cell fusion involving nuclear replacement and not by fertilisation involving sperm cells.
Beyond that, the Act also declares a prohibition on the artifi cially creation of 
“genetically identical” human beings.17 The terminology of this rule can be applied to the 
method of embryo splitting, but not to the process of SCNT. As it was presented previously, 
an embryo created via SCNT is not genetically totally identical to the ancestor because of 
the very low mDNA remaining in the cytoplasm of the enucleated egg.
The Oviedo Convention, which was promulgated in Hungary by an act in 2002, also 
poses a ban on interventions “seeking to create a human being genetically identical to 
another human being”, however, the Convention faces with the biological facts as it states 
that the “term human being »genetically identical« to another human being means a human 
being sharing with another the same nuclear gene set”.18
Similarly to the broad language of the Health Care Act, the terminology of the 
Hungarian Criminal Code regarding this fi eld is also inadequate for the description of the 
biological reality. For example, the Criminal Code states that any person who uses a human 
13 Andrews, L. B.: Is There a Right to Clone? Constitutional Challenges to Bans on Human 
Cloning. Harvard Journal of Law and Technology, 11 (1998) 3, 647; Brown, B.: Human Cloning and 
Genetic Engineering: The Case for Proceeding Cautiously. Albany Law Review, 65 (2002) 3, 666. 
14 Strong, C.: Reproductive Cloning Combined with Genetic Modifi cation. Journal of Medical 
Ethics, 31 (2005) 11, 655.
15 Robertson, J. A.: Gay and Lesbian Access to Assisted Reproductive Technology. Case 
Western Reserve Law Review, 55 (2004) 2, 366–367.
16 Act CLIV of 1997 on Health. Sec. 165. a).
17 Ibid. Sec. 185. (5).
18 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard 
to the Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine (Oviedo, 
4. IV. 1997). Additional Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity 
of the Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine, on the Prohibition of 
Cloning Human Beings (Paris, 12. I. 1998). Articles 1.1 and 1.2.
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embryo to create several human embryos commits a felony offense;19 and any person who 
separates the cells of a human embryo,20 or any person who creates genetically equivalent 
human species commits a felony offense, too.21 These rules cover the method of embryo 
splitting, but neither of them could be applied to SCNT due to the aforesaid biological facts. 
Solely one criminal rule could be affected by SCNT, which prohibits the performance of 
medical experiments on human embryos or gametes without a licence, and prohibits the 
creation of human embryos for scientifi c purposes.22 The effect of this rule could be applied 
to whatever experiment or research and SCNT is still at experimental stage. Albeit, the 
meaning of embryo is also problematic under criminal law, because the Health Care Act is 
the base of the defi nition of the embryo which operates with the concept of fertilisation. As 
mentioned above, SCNT lacks fertilisation.
The problems with the terminology of the Hungarian law can be found in the German 
regulation too. The provisions concerning the meaning of an embryo of the German Embryo 
Protection Act lead also to a regulatory pitfall. According to the Act embryo means the 
human egg cell fertilised and capable of developing from time of fusion of the nuclei23 (i.e. 
the egg and the sperm). This defi nitive starting point does not cover the method of SCNT. 
The terminology of the ban of cloning is also inaccurate, it declares the prohibition of 
causing a human embryo to develop with the same genetic information as another human 
being.
In England the early legal defi nition of the embryo was similar to the Hungarian one, 
the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 stated that embryo means a live human 
embryo where fertilisation is complete.24 It is apparent that the Act envisaged the merger of 
the gametes. Therefore, the Parliament adopted the Human Reproductive Cloning Act in 
2001 which comprises the prohibition of placing in a woman an embryo created otherwise 
than by fertilisation.25 After the revision of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act in 
2008, the Act already states that references to an embryo include an egg that is in the 
process of fertilisation or is undergoing any other process capable of resulting in an 
embryo.26 So, the regulation in England was amended due to the development of 
biotechnology.
In the United States President Bill Clinton was the fi rst who wished to deal with the 
legislative responses of cloning. He issued an executive order in 1997 (in the year Dolly 
was born) banning the use of federal founds for human reproductive cloning research and 
urged the Congress to pass the proposed Human Cloning Prohibition Act.27 Notably, the 
Congress has not enacted any bills regarding human reproductive cloning yet. In spite of 
that there is no federal law on this subject, several states passed laws relating to prohibiting 
19 Act IV of 1978 on the Criminal Code. Sec. 173/E (2) f).
20 Ibid. Sec. 173/F (2) b).
21 Ibid. Sec. 173/G (1).
22 Ibid. Sec. 173/E (1).
23 Act for Protection of Embryos 1991. Sec. 8(1).
24 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990. Sec. 1(1).
25 Human Reproductive Cloning Act 2001. Sec. 1(1). This Act was repealed in 2008 by the 
enactment of the new Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act.
26 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (as amended). Sec. 1(2) (b).
27 Kunich: op. cit. 8.
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either expressly human reproductive cloning or the experiments carried out on human 
embryos.28 It should be mentioned that there are a large number of states which have no 
laws concerning reproductive cloning at all.29
4. Factual concerns regarding human reproductive cloning
The early overheated debates on the ethical and theoretical dimension of human reproductive 
cloning seem to be calmed down now, and evaluation occurs under more sober 
circumstances. It may play an important role in that after the creation of Dolly the vast 
majority of governments engaged themselves to adopt reassuring regulations prohibiting 
this type of human procreation, although the regulations are not complete.
Reproductive cloning would also be a kind of method to create an embryo, a child, a 
human being. However, it would be basically different from natural procreation and from 
current assisted reproductive technologies, because traditionally an embryo is a result of the 
fusion of an egg and a sperm, and the way of cloning would exclude the male gametes from 
the process. Furthermore, the genetic material of the cloned embryo would come almost 
entirely from one ancestor.30 Up to this point there is no distinction between that and e.g. 
therapeutic cloning, the essential difference lies in the motive, the aim of reproductive 
cloning would be the birth of the cloned embryo.
If we read again Huxley’s, Wells’s or Merle’s utopian novels, we can see that fi ction 
did not absolutely come true, but it does not seem so extremely surreal. We do not have to 
forget that the several horrifi c prophecies about the cloning of masses largely ignore the 
scientifi c facts, but they demonstrate vigorously the social refusal of cloning, the fear from 
the unleashing Frankenstein’s monster.31 However, it is nothing more than a mere fantasy. 
Due to the fact that therapeutic cloning, which aims to isolate embryonic stem cells from an 
early stage cloned embryo for therapeutic purposes has not been perfectly developed so 
far,32 maybe it cannot be expected that science could produce an entire viable and healthy 
human individual via reproductive cloning, even if procreative liberty would include the 
right to have a child through SCNT.
28 See Arkansas Code § 20-16-1002; Louisiana Revised Statutes § 14:87.2; Maine Revised 
Statutes tit. 22 §1593; Michigan Complied Laws § 333.16274; Minnesota Statutes § 145.421, 422; 
North Dakota Century Code § 12.1-39; South Dakota Codifi ed Laws § 34-14-27; Virginia Code § 
32.1-162.32-2; Connecticut General Statutes § 19a-32d–19a-32g; Illinois Compiled Statutes § 
410 110/; Iowa Code § 707C.1-707C.4; California Business and Professions Code § 16004, 16105 
and California Health and Safety Code § 24185, 24187; Maryland Code § 10-429-10-442; 
Massachusetts General Laws ch. 111L; New Jersey Statutes § 26:2Z-2; Missouri Revised Statutes § 
1.217. 
29 Beyond that, the self-regulation of science involves some non-compulsory documents 
regarding this fi eld. See e.g. the guidelines of the National Academy of Sciences or the guidelines of 
the Internetional Society for Stem Cell Research. Hynes, R. O. et al.: Guidelines for Human 
Embryonic Stem Cell Research. Washington, 2005. Daley, G. Q. et al.: Guidelines for the Conduct of 
Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research. Deerfi eld, 2006.
30 Grad, F. P.: The Debate on Human Cloning and Legislative Morality: Notes on Eugenics for 
an Age of Affl uence. Journal of Legislation and Public Policy, 4 (2000–2001) 1, 4. Shapiro: op. 
cit. 31.
31 Kunich: op. cit. 2.
32 Doerfl inger, R. M.: The Many Casualties of Cloning. The New Atlantis, Spring (2006) 62.
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Essentially, several arguments aim to challenge the idea of reproductive cloning, these 
could be organized into the following main categories.
(1) Religious and moral grounds: These claims rest on deep personal belief and focus 
on that an embryo is a human being with full moral status; that man should not intervene in 
the process of natural reproduction of humans; and that manipulations and experiments on 
human embryos should be rejected.33 The religious and moral grounds may frequently be of 
great relevance to the forthcoming reasons, too.
(2) Philosophical and ethical considerations are able to provide arguments about the 
thoughts of “good” and “evil”, about the existential issues regarding “human condition” 
which could largely contribute to the support or condemnation of the idea of human 
reproductive cloning.  
(3) The fundamental concept of the “slippery slope” argument regarding reproductive 
cloning has not a scientifi c but a science fi ctional origin. It warns that the allowing of 
human cloning for reproductive purposes could set off a chain reaction and may eventually 
lead to the creation of the perfect army or to the recreation of fallen tyrants of extinct eras 
etc.34
(4) The “playing God” argument is rooted in the religious and moral grounds, 
however, it can be seen separately as long as it is frequently noticed and has a solid 
characteristic. It means that man increasingly wants to transform and control what God (or 
Nature) has ordinated but without possessing God’s wisdom.35
(5) Medical, physical grounds: these challenge the effectiveness and safety of the 
method of human reproductive cloning by SCNT and are of signifi cant importance, because 
the technology of cloning is not either scientifi cally perfected in animal research.
(6) The legal concerns per se cannot be separated from the ethical, ideological and 
theoretical issues, which are necessarily taken into account by the legal evaluation and the 
development of a legislative pathway.36
It should be stressed that special emphasis can be laid upon medical grounds, these can 
be interpreted as the factual and rational arguments against human reproductive cloning.
Our current medical knowledge is grossly insuffi cient to allow a realistic expectation 
concerning a cloned human, it cannot be predicted whether a cloned human would suffer 
from birth defects or any other diseases later in life.37 Human reproductive cloning involves 
the use of a considerably complicated micromanipulation technique, e.g. the “genetic clock” 
of the transferred nucleus needs to be reset and reactivated, because it is not in the same 
level of development as the enucleated egg. Animal experiments provide wide range of 
reliable published data which demonstrate that the success rate of cloning by SCNT is low, 
the cloned animal frequently has an unstable genetic make-up, has hidden genetic 
abnormalities or has a short life expectation. The well-known example is Dolly the sheep, 
which was successfully born after 277 attempts and died six years after birth.38 
33 Kunich: op. cit. 9–10.
34 Ibid. 12.
35 Kass, L. R.: Ageless Bodies, Happy Souls: Biotechnology and the Pursuit of Perfection. The 
New Atlantis, Spring (2003) 18.
36 Kunich: op. cit. 11–12.
37 Andrews: op. cit. 650.
38 Elsner: op. cit. 597.
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Furthermore, the genetic inheritance of future generations raises also tangible questions 
in relation to the method of SCNT.39 Notably, germ line manipulations and unexpected 
genetic mutations have an irreversible effect on all of the descendants of the affected human 
being. On the other hand, reproductive cloning would be an intervention into the genetic 
heritage of humanity as the genetic make-up of the cloned offspring would be transmitted 
from almost exclusively one person.
In sum, the medical and physical uncertainties of SCNT are deemed suffi ciently 
serious to demolish the theory of human reproductive cloning. By virtue of these major 
concerns it is obviously premature to argue for the clinical application of SCNT whether or 
not it could be involved in the concept of reproductive freedom.
5. Determining the “open future”
Beyond the above broadly presented grounds there are further potential arguments which 
should be taken into consideration regarding the issue of reproductive cloning. 
Notwithstanding that the subject of human dignity, identity, instrumentalization and 
determinism may reach a philosophical dimension, it also generates a great deal of debates 
on the topic of cloning and could be of particular importance in the legislative 
framework, too.
It is a prevalent objection against reproductive cloning that a cloned individual would 
exist for particular purposes or determined expectations, and if the cloned individual fails 
to meet these wishful requirements, he or she would be deprived of all reason for existence 
to the creators.40 This conception could be fed by several phenomena, for example the 
parents might have a desire for replacing a deceased child by cloning or they might create a 
further offspring who could serve then as an organ or tissue bank for an existing but 
seriously ill child. Technique can be applied for many things. But we have to pay attention 
to the question: does any person have a right to an “open future”?
Accordingly, as some legal concerns suggest reproductive cloning for specifi c purposes 
would threaten the human dignity of the offspring and would have a devastating impact on 
our traditional conceptions about the beginning of life, there would be a glaring difference 
between an individual person with an independent open future and a copied person with a 
dependent determined future.41 Nevertheless, it should be explicitly stressed that 
reproductive cloning for specifi c purposes–and thus instrumentalization and objectivization–
is not feasible in the constitutional and human rights framework of our societies. 
Consequently, every human being coming into existence by whatever means has the right to 
life and human dignity, because he or she is a born and living person. It could not be stated 
that the cloned person would have lower dignity and intrinsic value because he or she was 
conceived and born not by means of the union of an egg and sperm. This would be solely a 
biological fact which under no circumstances exhaust the concept of identity and 
personhood,42 and should not affect the legal perception of a born and living human being.
39 Brown: op. cit. 662.
40 Braun, K.: Menschenwürde und Biomedizin. Frankfurt am Main, 2000. 183.
41 Gründel, J.: Läuft die Ethik immer “hinterher”? Zur Anwendung von Klon-Verfahren und 
genetischen Experimenten mit menschlischen Embryonen. In: Köhler, W. (Hrsg.): Klonen–Forschung 
und Ethik im Konfl ikt. Halle, 2000. 161.
42 Hottois, G.: Is Cloning the Absolute Evil? Human Reproduction Update, 4. (1998) 6,788.
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Hamlet’s dilemma arises at this point: to be, or not to be. It would be nonsense to 
assert that a person is worse off if born through cloning than if never born at all.43 From a 
legal perspective it should be noted that an unconceived and unborn person possesses no 
such right like right to natural fertilisation or right to any genetic condition as an 
unconceived and unborn person also has not the right of not being born. The existence and 
the human nature of the cloned person could not be disavowed, and because of the 
biological, temporal and environmental infl uences the cloned person would not be identical 
to the ancestor neither physically nor psychologically. He or she would be a unique 
individual with unique identity and unpredictable future, and he or she would be entitled to 
all of the human and other rights.44
It should be emphasized that procreation through SCNT would also involve gestation, 
delivery and development, the method of human cloning could not produce an entire person 
itself with own personal identity. Neither the suddenness of nature nor the precision of 
science is able to create two totally identical human beings, the personality is impossible to 
be reproduced.45 This will be apparent if we draw our attention to the defi nition of genotype 
and phenotype of a person. Genotype means the genetic make-up, the inheritable genetic 
information of an individual, while phenotype refers to the observable characteristics and 
traits of an individual such as eye color or intelligence. However, even if some phenotypic 
traits are largely determined by genotype (e.g. eye color, height), there are a great number 
of characteristics which are the result of environmental factors or the interaction between 
genes and environment.46 Although genes have more or less infl uence on the person’s 
physical and psychological features, the idea of genetic determinism–the one gene one 
trait–is widely obsolete. Moreover, naturally conceived identical twins exhibit same 
genotypes but different phenotypes.47
Notwithstanding that the principle of human dignity has played a key role during the 
preparation of human rights documents in the 20th century, and it can be seen as the 
ultimate source of human rights and a pervasive constitutional value, the defi nition of 
human dignity is perceived as an elusive, culturally embedded and nationally distinctive 
concept.48 We can accept the approach that the idea of dignity is metaphysically or 
philosophically complete and perfect, but in pragmatical and legal sense the theory of 
dignity is defi cient and ambiguous, it needs additional interpretation.49 Thus, as international 
human rights documents and national laws frequently make reference to dignity per se in 
connection with outlawing human cloning–i.e. that human reproductive cloning violates 
human dignity–does not contribute to a reassuring result. For example it would be diffi cult 
to provide a solid interpretation to the provision of the Oviedo Convention which sets forth 
43 Robertson (2000–2001): op. cit. 40.
44 Robertson (2000–2001): op. cit. 41. Grad: op. cit. 4.
45 Silver: op. cit. 52.
46 Brencsán, J.–Krúdy, E.: Orvosi szótár (Medical Dictionary). Budapest, 2002. 237, 507.
47 Kamm, F. M.: Cloning and Harm to Offspring. Journal of Legislation and Public Policy, 4 
(2000–2001) 1, 66; Baum, K.: Golden Eggs: Towards the Rational Regulation of Oocyte Donation. 
Brigham Young University Law Review, (2001) 1, 120.
48 Carozza, P. G.: Human Dignity in Constitutional Adjudication. In: Ginsburg, T.–Dixon, R. 
(eds): Comparative Constitutional Law. Cheltenham, 2011. 460.
49 Ashcroft, R. E.: Making Sense of Dignity. Journal of Medical Ethics, 31 (2005) 11, 680; 
Kersten: op. cit. 473.
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that “the instrumentalisation of human beings through the deliberate creation of genetically 
identical human beings is contrary to human dignity”.50
What is defi nitely common in all human beings irrespective of anything else? Which 
factors constitute the incontestable moral status of a human being? And, in particular, whose 
dignity would be violated by cloning?
Generally, the theory of human dignity could be apprehended in a European 
philosophical-cultural dimension, in which dignity is linked to the Kantian ethics.51 The 
Kantian principle states that a human being is an end in itself, does not have mere relative 
worth, but an intrinsic worth, a dignity.52 This ethos has had an overwhelming impact on the 
European human rights systems, however, the defi nition alone cannot be applied to 
biotechnology, it allows selective interpretation. Moreover, the blood, organ and tissue 
donation could be deemed prohibited under the shield of this doctrine.
Accordingly, it can be asserted that human reproductive cloning as a theoretical form 
of procreation would not attack the dignity of the cloned person, because it would serve the 
birth of the cloned person.53 The dignity of a person cannot be violated simply by coming 
into existence through any kind of method of procreation, otherwise the not-coming-into-
existence would be objectively the preferable situation.
It would be a more reasonable approach if we assumed that human reproductive 
cloning by SCNT could affect perhaps the dignity of the human race, and not the dignity of 
the individual person. In legal terms this could also signify that procreation via SCNT may 
raise comprehensive ethical and philosophical questions which highlight alternative ways 
for the legal regulation.
6. The necessity of state intervention
The theory of instrumentalization is also in tight connection with the aforesaid arguments, 
however, it has been appeared formerly in the area of the current forms of in vitro 
fertilisation, too.54 During the process of IVF more embryos are created in vitro than 
necessary for implantation and these surplus embryos are frequently discarded. Furthermore, 
often more embryos are implanted in order to increase the effectiveness of the method, but 
not every implanted embryo will lead to a successful pregnancy. A large number of embryos 
have solely a probability for a potential life, they are used as instruments to achieve one 
goal, the live birth of a healthy child.
50 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard 
to the Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine (Oviedo, 
4. IV. 1997). Additional Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity 
of the Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine, on the Prohibition of 
Cloning Human Beings (Paris, 12. I. 1998). Preamble.
51 Harris, J.: “Goodbye Dolly”. The Ethics of Human Cloning. Journal of Medical Ethics, 23 
(1997) 6, 354.
52 “[...] der Mensch kann von keinem Menschen […] bloß als Mittel, sondern muß jederzeit 
zugleich als Zweck gebraucht werden und darin besteht seine Würde.” Kant, I.: Die Metaphysik der 
Sitten. Zweiter Teil: Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Tugendlehre. Königsberg, 1797, § 38.
53 Kersten: op. cit. 485.
54 Ibid. 484.
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The question is whether the theory of instrumentalization has a different or qualifi ed 
meaning in relation to reproductive cloning. Cloning for particular purposes and for extreme 
ideas would exhaust the concept of instrumentalization. Accordingly, some commentators, 
especially in the United States argue that human reproductive cloning would be a form of 
“genetic slavery” labeling persons as properties and giving an overwhelming power to the 
creators; thus, reproductive cloning would be a new and radical form of instrumentalization 
and modern slavery.55 The assumptions behind this conception stem from the previously 
discussed arguments, but at this point it can also be stated that genetic determinism with 
particular expectations of the parents is totally without scientifi c value.
It should be noted that the idea of instrumentalization and its rebuttal is also theoretical. 
There is no vivid evidence that cloning as a type of human reproduction would be factually 
accompanied with intentional genetic manipulations for particular purposes.56 The 
“nonexistence paradox” presented above can be discovered in the instrumentalization 
argument, too: if the cloned person came into world, he or she would be subject to human 
rights as much as anybody else. The arguments against cloning give rise to speculations 
because we cannot certainly assert its opposite in the case of natural reproduction, where it 
would also be possible to conceive a child for particular purposes, the parents could have 
extreme expectations, the child could have unsuitable or irresponsible parents, the child’s 
rights could be injured etc.
Nonetheless, it is widely accepted that the state does not interfere with the decision of 
the parents if they procreate naturally, but reproductive cloning is even theoretically far 
away from becoming a further method of assisted reproductive technologies.
In spite of this, the tendency is traceable. There is no manner of doubt that natural 
reproduction by sexual intercourse is an essential part of procreative liberty enjoying 
constitutional protection, it is a basic right of all persons to decide freely whether or not to 
have children. Biotechnology allowed to extend procreative rights to infertile couples or 
individuals, and several types of non-coital reproduction by means of assisted reproductive 
techniques have been granted legal recognition. At the same time, current assisted 
reproductive technologies involve human gametes, i.e. an egg and a sperm. In the case of 
reproductive cloning by SCNT conception occurs also artifi cially, but the fundamental 
difference is that the embryo is a result of the fusion of an egg and a nucleus of a somatic 
cell, the male gamete is excluded from the process.
Could human reproductive cloning by SCNT be inserted into the more and more 
extended frames of the right to procreate or the right to privacy in the future?57
And what justifi es the radical state intervention against researches aiming human 
reproductive cloning? What kind of higher values compel the state to prohibit the future 
exercise of the procreative freedom of this sort? Some proponents suggest that reproductive 
cloning as a form of becoming a parent is not qualitatively different from the other assisted 
reproductive techniques where genetic manipulation is also available.58 And in both cases 
the result is a child.
55 Andrews: op. cit. 668. The “slavery argument” is also highly emphasised by the Catholic 
Church. See e.g. Pontifi cal Academy of Life: Refl exions on Cloning. Vatican City, 2000.
56 Kersten: op. cit. 494.
57 Brown: op. cit. 668.
58 Andrews: op. cit. 665.
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It is diffi cult to fi nd a tangible and logical explanation for the ban on carrying out 
researches on embryos with reproductive purposes. On the basis of the traditional democracy 
approach of Western cultures it could be outlined that legislatures for that very reason does 
not allow such a reproductive method because it is considered to be embarrassing and 
unpredictable and it is rejected by the vast majority of society. Simultaneously, other 
constitutional rights (like the right to procreate) are either not or only narrowly infringed by 
the prohibition. Probably, legislatures face with the medical and physical reasons, too. 
Additionally, it should not be forgotten that the method of cloning by SCNT without the 
male sperm would strongly affect our image about the beginning of human life, and the 
transcendency, mysticality and abstractum of human conception is hard to contest.
The condemnation of human reproductive cloning by societies originates in 
“offensive”, “grotesque”, “revolting”, “repugnant” and “repulsive” feelings–and perhaps 
this could be portrayed as the “wisdom of repugnance”.59
59 Kass, L. R.: The Wisdom of Repugnance. In: Kass, L. R.–Wilson, J. Q. (eds): The Ethics of 
Human Cloning. Washington, 1998. 17.
